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I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority
rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots.
The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works
as follows: In the ﬁrst ballot a β-majority rule is used, where β < 1
2 is equal to the
minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows the minority
to induce the adoption of project 1. After the ﬁrst ballot all voting winners,
i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming
second ballot, where the simple majority rule is used. Hence, MVE may beneﬁt
both project losers and winners and may thus be unanimously accepted. The
analysis of this short-term deviation is presented with a potential application in
the sphere of communal politics.
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Voting rules applied in committees, city councils, or elections usually require a majority to
change the status quo. The simple majority rule is the most common voting scheme. The
question addressed in this paper is whether a committee may want to deviate from the simple
majority rule and use an alternative voting scheme. Suppose that such a deviation from simple
majority voting is possible as long as it is accepted unanimously. Then an alternative voting
scheme for one single yes-no ballot would never be chosen, as some committee members would
beneﬁt while others would be disadvantaged. A deviation for at least two ballots, however,
may be possible, as losses in one ballot might be compensated by beneﬁts in another ballot.
Alternative voting rules can be of two types. Either diﬀerent vote thresholds are used so that
the voting rule favors one alternative over the other, or voting rights in future ballots are
changed.
In this paper I propose a new voting scheme that covers two consecutive ballots and serves
as a potential deviation from the simple majority rule. It combines both types of alternative
voting rules and works as follows: In the ﬁrst (open) ballot a β-majority rule is used, where
β < 1
2 is equal to the minority fraction that favors some project, say project 1. This allows
the minority to induce the adoption of project 1. After the ﬁrst ballot all voting winners,
i.e. the minority of project winners, lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot,
where the simple majority rule is used. I call this new voting scheme MVE, which stands for
’Minority Voting as an Exception’.1 The use of MVE, i.e. the deviation from simple majority
voting, has to be accepted unanimously.
I will show that individuals who favor a project will prefer MVE over simple majority voting
if their own project beneﬁts are large enough and if it would fail under simple majority
voting. Vice versa, individuals who suﬀer from the project also have incentives to deviate by
using MVE if their losses are compensated by higher expected utility in the second ballot.
As the deviation has to be accepted unanimously, all individuals need to expect some utility
gain for the deviation to be approved, i.e. expected aggregate utility will increase if MVE is
applied. In addition, it is possible to show that under complete uncertainty regarding the
second project, a project leading to an application of MVE is socially desirable in connection
with committee sizes typical of community councils in Germany. The community councils
example serves to illustrate how MVE can be applied.
1MVE gives the minority a new opportunity to realize its preferences. The idea of MVE was inspired by
Minority Voting as introduced by Fahrenberger and Gersbach (2008). They develop a voting scheme that
serves to protect a minority against repeated exploitation.
2The subject of this paper has two main links to the literature. First, the new voting scheme
serves minority protection as it gives small groups an additional possibility to realize their
own preferences. Minority protection is a widely discussed topic in the literature. New
voting schemes have been proposed, many of them increasing the inﬂuence of the minority
by allocating more than one vote per person and ballot. There are several variations of this
basic idea. One famous example is Cumulative Voting (see e.g. Sawyer and MacRae (1962),
Brams (1975), Cox (1990), Guinier (1994) or Gerber, Morton, and Rietz (1998)), where all
individuals obtain as many votes as there are candidates or issues to vote for. Only one ballot
is carried out. Individuals can cast more than one vote for one of the alternatives, which is
a way of expressing preferences intensity and also serves to protect minorities. This idea is
extended to a row of n decisions by Hortala-Vallve (2007), who introduced Qualitative Voting.
Storable Votes, as proposed by Casella (2005), is a voting mechanism where individuals can
store votes if a proposal has only a minor eﬀect on their utility. They can then use this
extra vote on a proposal that they ﬁnd more important. Fahrenberger and Gersbach (2008)
introduce Minority Voting where the inﬂuence of a minority is increased by reducing the size
of the group with voting rights.
Second, MVE is related to log-rolling, as can be seen in the following alternative formulation
for the new voting scheme: Individuals with a strong interest in a project propose that the
project be accepted (i.e. other individuals vote in favor of the project winners). Accordingly,
these project winners do not use their voting rights in the upcoming ballot. Under log-rolling,
individuals with diﬀerent payoﬀs and hence diﬀerent preferences agree upon strategic voting
ensuring that decisions are taken in favor of the individual who has the stronger interest
in it. Whether log-rolling is welfare-improving or not is discussed e.g. by Brams and Riker
(1973), Tullock (1974), Bernholz (1978), and Coleman (1983). One crucial problem here is
that the individual who supports the other agent by voting strategically in the ﬁrst ballot has
to rely on the other individual to abide by the agreement during the second ballot. Mueller
(1967) suggests that literally changing ballots paper can solve the reliability problem. MVE
diﬀers from log-rolling in one important way. Individuals with high payoﬀs from the ﬁrst
project have no voting rights in the second ballot. This leads to the expected utility gain for
individuals who keep their voting rights, and cannot be changed. Hence reliability is given.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, the current legal background in communal
politics is introduced, as this example will be used in the discussion of MVE later on. Section 3
covers the model, the voting scheme, and a discussion of optimal voting behavior of individuals
under MVE. The conditions necessary for an application of MVE, i.e. deviation from simple
3majority voting, are examined in section 4. A discussion of these results with respect to
communal politics follows in section 5. In section 6 I discuss whether and how strategic
voting can occur if some limitations of the basic model are weakened. Section 7 concludes.
2 Communal Politics in Germany
In the literature, communal politics is widely discussed. However, the focus is not on the vot-
ing scheme used in decision-making but on the distribution of power within a community and
its relation to certain rules that vary between diﬀerent states in Germany (‘Bundesl¨ ander’),
e.g. whether a mayor is directly elected by the inhabitants of the community or by the dele-
gates in the council. The structure of administration and council is also analyzed. There are
several books that give a good overview, e.g. Naßmacher and Naßmacher (2007) or Kost and
Wehling (2003). So far, the application of the voting rules (either simple majority voting or
an α-majority rule with α = 2
3) has not been questioned.
Community responsibilities, voting and election rules, composition of the community council
and the administration, etc. are set down in the municipal codes.2 Each federal state has
its own municipal code for the communities and cities within the range of its jurisdiction.
Despite diﬀerences in details, there are common characteristics such as:
(i) In regular decisions simple majority voting is applied and the ballot is open.
(ii) A two-thirds majority is required if the decision has to do with a change in the ge-
ographical area of the community, the community’s name, a change of the agenda,
non-open ballots, deselection of delegates or of the governing mayor.
(iii) A community council consists of anything between 8 and 60 delegates, depending on
the number of inhabitants.
(iv) Committee members know the agenda for each meeting.
(v) A committee is quorate if at least half of the committee members are present.
In the next section I present the model containing the new voting scheme, utility functions,
and the timing of events. The quality of the model with respect to an application in communal
politics will be discussed in section 3.5.
2The municipal codes (‘Gemeindeordnungen’) can be viewed e.g. on http://www.jura.uni-
osnabrueck.de/institut/jkr/kronline.htm, as at December 11, 2008.
43 The Model
3.1 The Alternative Voting Scheme
Minority Voting as an Exception is deﬁned as follows:
MVE:
The voting scheme MVE applies in two successive ballots. In the ﬁrst ballot a β-fraction with
β < 1
2 has to support a proposal to change the status quo for it to be accepted. All voting
winners from this ballot lose their voting rights for the upcoming second ballot. In the second
ballot the simple majority rule applies. All ballots are open.
In addition, a constitution is needed that allows deviation from simple majority voting upon
request. In particular, I assume that the committee acts under the following rules, deﬁning
constitution C:
• The simple majority rule is the default voting scheme. Ballots are open.
• Before a ballot upon some project x takes place, committee members may propose an
application of MVE for the two upcoming ballots, where the choice of β has to be
included in the proposal.3
• The committee has to be unanimous on the application of MVE.
• Within two MVE ballots, no further application of MVE can be proposed.
Constitution C allows for a deviation from simple majority voting that always yields an
increase in expected aggregate utility. However, it may also lead to time delays if MVE is
proposed but not accepted.
3.2 Utility
Assume a committee of N individuals (with N odd) deciding upon several projects one after
the other.
• Utility of a project x is given by uix = ax·zix with zix ∈ [−1,1]. ax denotes the decision
of the committee: ax = 1 if project x is accepted, ax = 0 if it is rejected.
• When a ballot on a project x takes place, the payoﬀs zix are common knowledge.
• Overall utility is given by the sum of all realized project payoﬀs. Discounting is ne-
3For the analysis I restrict the choice of β such that no diﬀerent proposals can be submitted. I comment on
the case of a free choice of β in section 6.
5glected as the decisions take place in one meeting. Therefore the realization of all
projects that have been accepted may also take place at the same time.
The deviation voting scheme MVE extends across two ballots. Accordingly, I restrict the
analysis to two projects, which means that only one decision about an application of MVE
will be analyzed. The corresponding projects are denoted by project 1 and project 2. The ﬁrst
project is crucial for the application of MVE. In the following I introduce some assumptions
on these projects.
3.2.1 Assumption on Project 1
The ﬁrst-project payoﬀs are common knowledge and have already been distributed when the
decision about MVE takes place. This project divides the committee into two subgroups, the
group of project winners W and the group of project losers L. For simplicity I assume
A1: First-project payoﬀs are either zi1 = zW ∈ [0,1] for all individuals i ∈ W and zi1 =
zL ∈ [−1,0) for all i ∈ L, where W denotes the group of project winners and L denotes
the group of project losers.
An immediate consequence of A1 is that all L-members and all W-members have identical
strategic considerations when it comes to a decision on MVE.4
3.2.2 Assumptions on Project 2
Here I use a universal approach allowing the later choice of diﬀerent parameter constellations
reﬂecting diﬀerent levels of information within the committee. Assumptions:
• W-members have probability φW of beneﬁting from the second project as well,
i.e. φW = P[zi2 ≥ 0|i ∈ W]. Probability φW is common knowledge.
• L-members have probability φL of beneﬁting from the second project,
i.e. φL = P[zi2 ≥ 0|i ∈ L]. Probability φL is common knowledge.
• All individuals know the density functions u−(zi2) on [−1,0) and u+(zi2) on [0,1]. Note
that mass 1 is put on each subinterval of [−1,1] because of the conditional probabilities
φW and φL.
4A more general approach with diﬀerent zi1 within each group W and L implies that the individuals with
the lowest utility in each group determine the thresholds that yield an application of MVE. See section 4.
6An explicit density function of the second-project payoﬀs is not needed for the analysis.
Instead, the expected values of zi2 restricted to being (non-)negative are suﬃcient. I denote
these values by z+
E =
R 1





The time structure is given as follows:
1. Project 1 is proposed. Individuals learn about payoﬀs zi1 from project 1, i.e. the payoﬀs
are common knowledge, determining the W-group and the L-group.
2. All members can propose the application of MVE for the upcoming two ballots, i.e. the
ﬁrst ballot under MVE is the decision on project 1, while the second ballot includes the
decision on some unknown project 2.
3. The committee decides unanimously on the application of MVE.
4. If MVE is rejected, the simple majority rule is applied in both ballots on project 1 and
project 2.5 If MVE is accepted, the β-rule is applied in the ﬁrst ballot. Voting rights
are distributed according to the deﬁnition of MVE.
Note that time is neglected in the sense that there is no other ballot that has to be canceled
for the additional decision about an application of MVE. Here we can take city councils as
an example. They generally meet to discuss certain topics that are constituted before. This
may take more or less time.
W-members have no incentive to deviate from simple majority voting if project 1 is realized
in a regular ballot under the simple majority rule. Therefore the only interesting case occurs
if the W-group forms a minority. This imposes the following assumption:
A2: W-members form a minority, i.e. |W| ∈ {1,..., N−1
2 }.6
For completeness a tie-breaking rule is needed in the case of indiﬀerence between MVE and
the simple majority rule:
A3: Committee members will propose MVE if and only if the expected utility under MVE is
strictly higher than under the simple majority rule.
5As the analysis is restricted to two projects, no further application of MVE after the ﬁrst ballot is reasonable.
Without the restriction to two projects, the committee would return to the default voting scheme after the
two MVE ballots. Furthermore, no further application of MVE can be proposed within an MVE cycle.
6|S| denotes the number of pairwise diﬀerent elements in a set S.
7I assume strict improvement under MVE, as proposing MVE may make for a time delay if
rejected. This may be costly and hence should be avoided.
Note that the proposed β-fraction has to be smaller than or equal to the minority fraction in
the society, i.e. β ∈ (0,
|W|
N ]. To avoid the possibility of strategic choices of β, I simplify the
analysis by assuming
A4: The only β that can be proposed for an application of MVE is given by β =
|W|
N .
This requirement is plausible, as all committee members know the minority fraction. Free
choice of β will be discussed in section 6.
3.4 Voting Equilibria
I apply the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibria. Weakly dominated strategies are excluded.
Under simple majority voting all committee members vote sincerely in both ballots. Regard-
ing optimal voting behavior under MVE the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 Suppose that MVE with β =
|W|
N has been proposed and unanimously accepted.
Then,
• in the ﬁrst ballot under MVE, all minority (W) members will vote for the project and
all majority (L) members will vote against the project;
• in the ballot on project 2 all individuals with voting rights will vote sincerely.
The ﬁrst point holds as the W-group has to achieve the required β-threshold. No W-member
has an incentive to deviate from this strategy, as project 1 will otherwise not be realized, while
the L-group together with the deviating W-members turns into the group of voting winners,
thus losing their voting rights. Vice versa, voting against project 1 ensures all L-members
voting rights for the upcoming second ballot.
In the vote on project 2 voting sincerely weakly dominates voting strategically.
3.5 Relation to the Application Example
After introducing the model, I now brieﬂy compare the theoretical assumptions with the
predeﬁned setting of communal politics as presented in section 2.
• The simple majority rule as a default voting scheme is reasonable.
8• The application of MVE implies a change of the agenda that again requires a two-thirds
majority, as stated in the municipal codes. This requirement is satisﬁed by constitution
C, as MVE has to be accepted unanimously.
• Standard assumptions include complete uncertainty about upcoming projects. How-
ever, this does not adequately reﬂect the procedure in community councils, as council
members have knowledge about the agenda and may even work on proposals them-
selves. The universal setting presented in section 3.2.2 covers this issue. Under this
approach, the choice of parameters can be used to illustrate uncertainty as well as
ex-ante knowledge, strong party aﬃliation, or linked projects.
• All W-members lose their voting rights, which implies that more than half of the com-
mittee keep the voting rights for the second ballot. This property goes hand in hand
with the municipal codes by requirement (v) as stated in section 2: A community
council is quorate only if at least half of the committee members are present at the
meeting.
The next step is to compare MVE with simple majority voting (henceforth SM) to derive
conditions on ﬁrst-project payoﬀs that yield an application of MVE.
4 Conditions for an Application of MVE
This section derives the conditions necessary for an application of MVE and hence for in-
centives to deviate from simple majority voting. I determine the individual expected utility
under MVE for W- and L-members and compare it with the corresponding terms without
the application of MVE, i.e. under SM. The calculations require the individual probability of
winning in the second ballot, as described in the following.
4.1 Probability of Winning in the Second Ballot
The winning probabilities of W- and L-members in the second ballot using the voting rule
x ∈ {MVE,SM} are denoted by
• Px
W+ = winning probability of a W-member i given zi2 ≥ 0.
• Px
W− = winning probability of a W-member i given zi2 < 0.
• Px
L+ = winning probability of an L-member i given zi2 ≥ 0.
• Px
L− = winning probability of an L-member i given zi2 < 0.
9As the assumptions on the second project are very general the probabilities are complex
expressions. The calculation of all winning probabilities is given in the Appendix. The basic
concept is explained within reference to the example of PMV E
L+ in the following.
Under MVE only L-members are allowed to vote in the second ballot. Thus the probability
of winning for an L-member i under MVE is determined by the question whether at least half
of the other L-members have payoﬀs tending in the same direction as the individual under
consideration. If N − |W|, i.e. the number of individuals with a voting right, is odd, then
i will win if at least
N−|W|−1
2 other individuals vote the same way. If N − |W| is an even
number, then i will win if either more than
N−|W|
2 individuals favor the same alternative or if
individual i wins the tie-break (with probability 1
2) in the case of
N−|W|
2 −1 other individuals
voting in the same way. Let TB be the case where a tie-break can occur. It is given by7









1, if N − |W| is even (i.e.
N−|W|
2 ∈ N)
0, if N − |W| is odd.
Suppose that i observes zi2 ≥ 0, i.e. she is a project winner. Then her probability of winning




























In the formula, winning a tie-break is included in the ﬁrst term, i.e. in the sum over k.
Therefore the probability of losing a tie-break is substracted in the second term.
The next step is to compare the expected utility for W- and L-members under MVE and
SM.
4.2 Comparison
A comparison between MVE and SM requires the calculation of expected utility. I give an
example for an L-member if MVE is applied. All remaining calculations are given in the
proof of the upcoming Proposition 1.
7bxc = max{y ∈ N : y ≤ x} and dxe = min{y ∈ N : y ≥ x}.
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u(z)dz + φL(1 − PMV E
L+ ) · 0 + (1 − φL)PMV E
L− · 0





= zL + φLPMV E
L+ z+
E + (1 − φL)(1 − PMV E
L− )z−
E.
Expected utility consists of the following parts: the utility from the ﬁrst project realized
under MVE, i.e. zL, and the expected utility from the second project. The latter can be split
up into four subparts: (1) having a positive zi2 and winning, i.e. project 2 will be realized,
(2) positive zi1 and losing, (3) negative zi2 and winning, i.e. project 2 will be rejected, and
(4) negative zi1 and losing.
Comparing expected utility under MVE and SM for L- and W-members yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Given a distribution of zi2 on [−1,1], represented by z+
E and z−
E, the commit-
tee’s size N, the minority’s size |W|, and the conditional probabilities of being a second-project
winner φW and φL, the following statements hold:
• L-members will prefer an application of MVE if and only if
zL > φL(PSM
L+ − PMV E
L+ )z+





• W-members will prefer an application of MVE if and only if
zW > φW(PSM
W+ − PMV E
W+ )z+





The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix. Note that both threshold values have
the same structure: expected utility diﬀerence between MVE and SM when being a project
winner regarding the second project, plus expected utility diﬀerence when being a project
loser.
5 Discussion
As indicated, the general setting has the advantage of being interpretable for several situations
in community councils:
• Having a (relatively) stable partition into majority and minority (|φW − φL| large).
11This occurs notably in political committees where party membership determines the
overall partition of the group. Other examples include international committees where
nationality determines preferences.
• Linked projects, i.e. individuals are either project winners of both projects or project
losers (φW large while φL small, or vice versa). Examples include related projects such
as building a new airport and thus having to build a new highway to ensure access. Both
projects might induce noise pollution for the same group of people, while guaranteeing
improved transport connection for another group.






• While φW and φL describe individual beliefs about own preferences on projects, the
parameters z+
E and z−
E illustrate whether the project imposes large or small utility
impacts in general. They represent diﬀerent distributions of zi2 over [−1,1]. Examples
are projects that beneﬁt only one group but cause other individuals no harm, such as
building a new gymnasium for a school, i.e. z−
E is close to zero and z+
E large.
Two scenarios will now be analyzed in more detail. The ﬁrst, called S1, reﬂects uncertainty
about the second project. In the second, denoted by S2, project winners (losers) have a high
probability of being project winners (losers) again. Plots are used to derive some observations
summarized in the following lemma. The plots are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 Given committee sizes typical of German community councils, i.e. N ∈ {7,...,61},





2 and φL = φW = 1
2, then
• ˜ zL is negative, tends to increase in N, is decreasing in |W|, and is mainly zero for very
small |W|.
• ˜ zW is positive and decreasing in N.





2, φL = 0.2 and φW = 0.8, then
• ˜ zL is decreasing in |W| and becomes positive for small minorities, i.e. small |W|.
• ˜ zW is positive and tends to decrease in N.
12Lemma 2 illustrates how much inﬂuence the level of information regarding future payoﬀs
has on the eﬀects of voting schemes, as the results diﬀer widely between S1 and S2. All
observations are discussed in the following.
The threshold ˜ zL
The observation that for small W-groups ˜ zL > 0 in S2 and ˜ zL ≈ 0 in S1 implies that L-
members will not want to deviate from simple majority voting, i.e. they would not accept
MVE. Proposing MVE only makes for costly delay. The reason is that a small W-group
leads to a smaller increase in the probability of winning in the second ballot, i.e. MVE is
less attractive for L-members. This property is tightened in S2 as this setting leads to a
relatively stable partition into minority and majority. Therefore L-members, i.e. majority
members, are most likely to win in the second ballot, whether ﬁrst-project minority members
have voting rights or not. Their incentive to accept MVE decreases (˜ zL increases).
The threshold ˜ zW
Similar reasoning explains the observation that ˜ zW is decreasing in |W| under S2. All
W-members again have a very high probability of belonging to the minority when it comes to
the ballot on the next project. This implies that they will most likely lose in the next ballot,
especially if |W| is small. Deviating from simple majority voting by using MVE becomes more
attractive, as it guarantees at least the realization of their own preferences on project 1. For
similar reasons the threshold for W-members tends to be more relaxed (i.e. smaller) under
S2 than under S1, where projects 1 and 2 are technologically independent.
Social desirability of project 1
Note that an application of MVE improves every individual’s expected utility, as the change
in the voting scheme has to be accepted unanimously. However, it also leads to the realization
of a project, namely project 1, that beneﬁts only a minority. It might be interesting to ask
whether this project is socially desirable, i.e. whether project 1 implies an aggregate welfare
increase: |W|zW + (N − |W|)zL > 0. Using the conditions for an application of MVE,
i.e. zW ≥ ˜ zW and zL ≥ ˜ zL, and rearranging this inequality yields a suﬃcient condition for
social desirability:
|W| > N ·
−˜ zL
˜ zW − ˜ zL
. (1)
Under S1, condition (1) is always fulﬁlled, i.e. MVE yields the realization of a socially desirable
project and is, in addition, Pareto-improving in terms of expected utility. Under S2, social
desirability of project 1 depends crucially on the size of the W-group. A larger W-group
increases aggregate welfare due to zW ≥ 0. The fact that, under S1, all projects leading to
13an application of MVE are socially desirable, stems from the observation that the threshold
˜ zW is higher than under S2, notably for small W-groups. In the Appendix I provide plots
underlining these results.
To sum up, the incentives to deviate from simple majority voting are very small for majority
members if the partition of the committee into majority and minority is rather stable, or
if the majority group is very large. Vice versa, deviation incentives are high for minority
members in the two cases. These cases may in fact make for timely and costly delays if
minority members propose MVE while majority members reject its application.
6 Implications of a Free Choice of β
By assumption A4 the choice of β is restricted to
|W|
N . This might lead to strategic considera-
tions on the part of W-members. Pretending to belong to the L-group may ensure the voting
right due to a smaller β, while it still yields an application of MVE and thus a realization of
project 1. This strategic behavior can be legalized by allowing the required minority fraction
β to be any number below 1
2 with the following consequences:
• β >
|W|
N will never be unanimously accepted, as some L-members would have to vote
for project 1, thus losing their voting rights while a decision conﬂicting with their
preferences is made.
• If β <
|W|
N is used, some W-members may keep their voting rights. A coordination
device among W-members is required to ensure that the β-threshold is reached, while
simultaneously guaranteeing that the inﬂuence of W-members in the second ballot is
maximized. This is of particular interest if W and L are stable groups, as in political
committees.
• In equilibrium, W-members will propose the minimal β ≤
|W|
N so that the requirements
zL > ˜ zL and zW > ˜ zW are still fulﬁlled, while L-members will propose the largest
possible β, i.e. β =
|W|
N . Therefore a free choice of β requires additional constitutional
rules that apply in the case where two diﬀerent MVE proposals are present, or else
exclude diﬀerent proposals. For example, one could restrict the right to propose MVE
to project winners only, or one might use a recognition rule ensuring that only one
committee member is allowed to propose MVE including β.
• The calculation of the threshold values ˜ zW and ˜ zL is based on the assumption that
β =
|W|
N . If a smaller β is chosen, the calculation changes in the following way:
14(i) The number of individuals with voting rights in the second ballot under MVE in-
creases, i.e. winning probability decreases. However, it remains higher than the value
of winning probability under SM.
(ii) The expected utility from the second project decreases for all L-members while it
increases for all W-members – directly, for those who keep their voting rights, indirectly
for those who lose it. The indirect utility increase stems from the fact that a larger
number of individuals with voting rights in the second ballot better reﬂects the society.
(iii) Overall, threshold ˜ zW will be weakened, i.e. it will decrease, whereas threshold ˜ zL
will be stronger, i.e. it will increase.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that individuals may have an incentive to deviate from simple majority voting
if an alternative voting scheme is provided for. The alternative I have proposed is a voting
procedure called MVE that favors the acceptance of a project in the sense that only a minority
has to approve its application. It covers two ballots, i.e. deviation from simple majority voting
is temporally restricted. The alternative voting procedure can only be applied upon request.
The incentives to use MVE instead of SM are higher for minority members who are in favor
of a project than for majority members, in particular in cases where either the partition of
the committee into majority and minority is fairly stable or where the minority group is very
small.
The main advantage of MVE is that it is only used when it is needed and desired. This
ensures aggregate utility gain. In addition, I demonstrate for middle-sized committees that a
project leading to an application of MVE is always socially desirable if the minority is large
enough, as it involves a high utility gain for project winners and a small loss for project losers.
Under uncertainty, all projects leading to MVE are socially desirable, regardless of whether
the W-group is minimum or maximum in size.
MVE is a short-term voting rule and is easily applied. This makes it particularly suitable
for middle-sized committees like community councils. The model introduced in this paper
is an adequate setting for community councils. Together with the results, i.e. increase in
expected aggregate utility and realization of socially desirable projects that otherwise get
rejected, MVE oﬀers an attractive alternative to the standard voting rule for community and
city councils. Hence deviation from simple majority voting can be welfare-improving and
deserves more discussion.
158 Appendix
Calculation of the probability of winning under MVE and SM




2 ce) to denote the function that is 1 if N − |W| is an
even number and 0 if not, i.e. it identiﬁes the parameter constellation where a tie-break (TB)
occurs.
MVE:



































































































































































































Proof of Proposition 1
The expected utility from MVE for W-members has the following structure: utility of the
ﬁrst project (zW) plus the expected utility of the second project that is a sum over all
possible situations, i.e. being a project winner (zi2 ≥ 0) with probability φW and winning
with probability PMV E
W+ , being a project loser with probability 1 − φW and winning with
probability PMV E
W− , and so forth.
This yields
UMV E




u(z)dz + φW(1 − PMV E
W+ ) · 0
+ (1 − φW)PMV E





= zW + φWPMV E
W+ z+









u(z)dz + φW(1 − PSM
W+) · 0
+ (1 − φW)PSM







E + (1 − φW)(1 − PSM
W−)z−
E.
A comparison between UMV E
W and USM
W gives us the threshold ˜ zW at which MVE is more
attractive for W-members than abstaining from the utility of project 1 while retaining the




⇔ zW > φW(PSM
W+ − PMV E
W+ )z+
E + (1 − φW)(PMV E
W− − PSM
W−)z−
E =: ˜ zW
The same calculations hold for L-members by replacing W by L.
Plots illustrating the threshold values ˜ zL and ˜ zW as described in Lemma 2
The ﬁrst plots (ﬁgures 1–3) show the threshold values ˜ zW and ˜ zL for both settings, S1 and
S2, with diﬀerent minority sizes.8 N runs from 7 to 61, hence reﬂecting committee sizes in






2. Part (b) corresponds to a biased project 2 (S2) where φW = 0.8
and φL = 1
2.
8The oscillating behavior stems from the fact that the probabilities of winning include binomial coeﬃcients.
This implies that they take the same values for an even number and the next-higher odd number, i.e. they
are a weakly decreasing step function.
18z[P] z[C]
N












(a) Uncertainty about project 2
z[P] z[C]
N








(b) Biased project 2
Figure 1: Thresholds when the group of project winners W is of maximum size,
i.e. |W| = N−1
2 . If the payoﬀ for project winners is larger than ˜ zW and
the payoﬀ for project losers is larger than ˜ zL, then MVE is proposed and














(a) Uncertainty about project 2
z[P] z[C]
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(b) Biased project 2














(a) Uncertainty about project 2
z[P] z[C]
N






(b) Biased project 2
Figure 3: Thresholds in the case where W is of minimum size, i.e. |P| = 1.
19Plots for the condition on social desirability of project 1, i.e. inequality (1)
Figure 4 shows the LHS and the RHS of inequality (1): |W| ≥ N· −˜ zL
˜ zW−˜ zL.9 The RHS is denoted
by S1 or S2 in the plots, according to the settings of Lemma 2. Again N ∈ {7,...,61} and
|W| ∈ {1, N−1
4 , N−1
2 } to indicate extreme cases.
S1 S2 Pmax
N































(c) Small minority: |W| = 1.
Figure 4: LHS (’Wmin/med/max’) and RHS (’S1’,’S2’) of the condition on social desirability of
project 1, where LHS > RHS has to hold. Note that the RHS also depends on the
number of project winners W.
For large W-groups, the LHS (Wmed, Wmax, see ﬁgure 4(a) and 4(b)) is always larger than
the RHS, i.e. project 1 is socially desirable. Thus the plots prove numerically that under
S1 all MVE projects are socially desirable and that a project 1 leading to MVE under S2 is
socially desirable if N ≤ 23 and |W| > 1. For larger N the cutting point between |W| and
N · −˜ zL
˜ zW−˜ zL moves from |W| = 1 to approximately |W| = N−3
4 for the largest assumed values
of N.
9We use min{−0.0001, ˜ zL}, as ˜ zL can be positive under S2.
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